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cooperative communication in CR networks
Tao Jing1 , Fan Zhang1 , Wei Cheng2* , Yan Huo1 and Xiuzhen Cheng3

Abstract
Cognitive radio and cooperative communication are two new network technologies. So, the combination of these
two new technologies is a novel solution to solve the problem of spectrum scarcity. Two main challenges exist in the
integration of cognitive radio and cooperative communication. First, there is a lack of incentives for the participating
wireless devices to serve as relay nodes. Second, there is not an effective relay selection policy. In this paper, we
propose an online auction-based relay selection scheme for cooperative communication in cognitive radio (CR)
networks. Specifically, we design an auction scheme through adopting stopping theory. The proposed scheme
ensures that the primary user (PU) can effectively select a CR relay to transmit its packets in a given time bound. In
addition, we have analytically proven the truthfulness and the individual rationality of our online auction scheme.
Extensive simulations demonstrate that the proposed relay selection scheme can always successfully and efficiently
select a proper relay for a PU and can achieve a higher cooperative communication throughput compared with the
conventional schemes.
Keywords: Online auction; Cooperative relay selection; Optimal multiple stopping theory

1 Introduction
Cognitive radio technology has been recognized to be
able to improve the spectrum utilization [1] through
opportunistic spectrum access without interfering with
the primary communications. Cooperative communication is an emerging technology that has the great potential
to increase the throughput between two wireless devices
[2] without requiring the support of infrastructure. Intuitively, the integration of these two hot technologies is
expected to be a solution for the problems of spectrum
scarcity and capacity limitation. In this paper, we particularly target on the scenario where the primary CR users
(PU) seek to find a suitable cognitive radio (CR) relay to
help transmit data, so that its end-to-end throughput can
be increased and its end-to-end delay can be reduced.
Certainly, this hybrid cognitive-cooperative communication architecture is facing both technical and practical
challenges. For instances, the relays should get sufficient
incentives for participating in the cooperative communications. In addition, if there are multiple candidate relays,
*Correspondence: wcheng3@vcu.edu
2 Department of Computer Science, Virginia Commonwealth University, 23284
Richmond, VA, USA
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article

it may be impossible/impractical for the primary user to
collect information from all the candidate relays to make
a decision of relay selection. The reason is twofold: (i)
The time for collecting information from all the candidate
relays may exceed the PU’s end-to-end delay tolerance,
and (ii) the availability of candidate relays may change during the collecting time as CR links are generally not stable.
Therefore, an idea cognitive-cooperative scheme should
be able to well incentivize the CR users and select a proper
relay in a given time.
To design such a scheme, we conservatively consider to
collect a candidate relay information and make the relay
selection decision for this candidate relay online so that
the collected information is valid and end-to-end delay
requirement can be satisfied. In other words, the candidate relays send their information (including its sealed
bid for cooperative transmissions) to the PU one by one.
After receiving the information from a candidate relay, the
PU immediately decides whether to choose this relay for
cooperative transmission. Once a relay has been selected,
the PU stops considering the rest of the candidate relays
and pays the chosen relay a compensation based on its bid.
In the paper, we consider the candidate relays as bidders
and the PU as buyer, respectively.
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Specifically, we design an online auction-based relay
selection scheme for cooperative CR communication. The
main contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows:
1. We formulate the online relay selection problem as
an optimal stopping problem and design an optimal
stopping policy, which can guarantee the success of
relay selection in a given time while control the cost
of PU for utilizing cooperative communication. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to
jointly adopt stopping theory and design auction
scheme for relay selection in CR networks.
2. We analytically prove the truthfulness of the
proposed online auction scheme without requiring
any information about bidders behavior. This result
guarantees the bid truthfulness of the candidate
relays and thereby eliminates the possibility of
market manipulation.
3. Our proposed online auction scheme is also
individual rational. This feature indicates that both
the PU and relay can be benefited from cooperative
transmission, which guarantees the incentive of
participation for both the PU and the relay.
4. Extensive experiments are conducted to study the
performance of our online auction scheme. We
investigate the impact of several parameters and
compare our scheme with the optimal relay selection
(ORS) scheme, which will look at all the candidate
relays for minimizing the PU cost. The results
demonstrate that the PU can always select an
appropriate relay in the given time, and our scheme
achieves a higher throughput than ORS with a tiny
cost increase.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The related
work is presented in Section 2. Preliminary is illustrated
in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe the proposed
stopping policy and the online auction scheme for cooperative communication. The analysis of our auction scheme
appears in Section 5. The simulation results are reported
and analyzed in Section 6. We conclude our paper in
Section 7.

2 Related work
In this section, we briefly review the most related works
to our research in the area of auction-based cooperative
communication.
In [3], Huang et al. treated relay nodes as sellers and
source nodes as buyers. Two auction mechanisms were
proposed: the SNR auction and the power auction. In each
auction mechanism, each user iteratively updates its bid
according to the others’ previous bids to maximize its
own profit. The existence and the uniqueness of the Nash
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equilibrium in a single-relay network has been proven. In
networks with multiple relays, the Nash equilibrium only
exists under certain conditions. Zhang et al. considered
the network scenario where there is a single relay and
multiple user nodes in [4]. The authors formulated this
problem as a sellers’ market competition. A distributed
algorithm has been developed to search the Nash equilibrium. In [5], Wang et al. studied the situation of one source
node and multiple relay nodes. The authors modeled it
as a Stackelberg game which is divided into two levels
of hierarchy. The benefits of the source node and relay
nodes were jointly considered. In [6], the authors formed a
cooperative cognitive radio network (CCRN) where each
PU employs a set of appropriate second users (SUs) for
relaying the PU’s information in an energy-efficiency solution. The relay selection and parameter optimization have
been formulated as two Stackelberg games. A unique
Nash equilibrium is achieved and proved for each game.
In [7], the authors supposed that SUs can make rational choice between cooperation and band leasing. This
novel CCRN model has been modeled as a Stackelberg
game and analyzed. In [8], the impact of spectrum leasing
was studied with a game-theoretic analysis. The authors
first illustrated the significance of the problem with a
two-secondary-user game. Subsequently, a n-secondaryuser game was studied and analyzed given the occupancy
model of primary users. However, none of the above work
had considered the truthfulness. As a result, these mechanisms are vulnerable to market manipulation and may
produce poor outcome [9].
In [10], the authors considered the problem of cooperative spectrum sensing scheduling in a CR network.
The author assumed that each SU has the freedom to
decide whether or not to participate in cooperative spectrum sensing; if not, the SU can wiretap the decision
on channel status made by other SUs. This mechanism
strived the balance between conserving the energy for
spectrum sensing and bring down the spectrum sensing
performance. In [11], Yang et al. designed an optimal relay
assignment algorithm for cooperative communication. In
[12], Klemperer designed a double auction mechanism
for cooperative communication. These two works satisfied the truthfulness requirements. They both needed to
collect the information from all the source nodes and all
the relay nodes, and their auction mechanisms were performed in a single-round fashion. As a comparison, our
approach does not require the information from all relay
nodes, and the auction is performed in an online manner.

3 Preliminary
In this section, we first give a description of online cooperative communication. Then, we present our system model
and depict the two common economic properties (truthfulness and individual rationality) of an auction.
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3.1 Online cooperative communication

In a CR network, it often happens that a PU (source node)
wants to send its data in a limited period of time. As the
source node is far away from the destination, it needs to
find a proper PU/SU as a relay to help it to transmit the
data, as shown in Figure 1. The source node returns the
relay node with monetary reward (the PU’s payment to
the selected node for relaying data). As the number of
wireless users is rapidly increasing due to the fast growing
number of mobile communication device and the source
node needs to obey the delay constraint, it is impossible
for the source node to detect all candidate relays. Besides,
the state of candidate relays change quickly with time. So,
after detecting a relay, the source node needs to make an
online decision whether to adopt this relay or not. In this
paper, we assume that the transmitter can only choose one
relay for cooperative transmission. A work by Zhao et al.
showed that it is sufficient for a source node to choose
the best relay even when multiple relay nodes are available
[13]. So, it is reasonable to assume that the PU transmitter will choose only one relay node for cooperative
transmission.
There exist two types of cooperative communication pattern: amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-andforward (DF) [2]. In AF, the relay amplifies the received
data and transmits it to the destination. In DF, the
relay fully decodes the data from the source node and
then delivers it after re-encoding the data. Our proposed
scheme can be applied to both of these two cooperative
communication patterns.
3.2 System model

In this paper, we consider a time-slotted system consisted
by a pair of primary transmitter and receiver (PU) and
a number of R candidate relays. The PU needs to send
out a packet within T time slots, and it values the packet
by β. The time needed for collecting information from

Figure 1 A model of online cooperative communication.
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each relay is α time slots. Then, the PU can check at most
M = T/α relays within T. The PU randomly collects
information from the R candidate relays one by one. The
ith candidate relay Xi has a private true valuation vi and a
bid price bi for forwarding the packet. When the PU collects the information from Xi , Xi returns its bid bi . Note
that, the bid bi is valid for α time slots, and each candidate relay bids in a sealed-bid manner. After receiving bi
from Xi , the PU needs to immediately make a decision on
whether to select Xi as the relay to transmit the packet or
continue to check Xi+1 . Table 1 summarizes the notations
used through this paper.
3.3 Economic properties
3.3.1 Truthfulness

An auction is truthful if revealing the private true value is
the dominate strategy for each bidder. This means that no
bidder can raise its utility by bidding bi  = vi , no matter
how others bids. This property can resist market manipulation and ensure the auction fairness and efficiency. In
untruthful auctions, a selfish bidder can alter its bid to
obtain extra outcome which will benefit itself but hurt the
others.
3.3.2 Individual rationality

An auction is individual rational if a winner (the selected
relay) is always paid by no less than its bid and the PU’s
cost is no more than the value of the packet. This property can ensure that the utilities of both the PU and the
selected relay are no less than 0. In other words, both the
PU and the selected relay have incentive to participate in
the cooperative communication.

4 Online auction scheme for relay selection
In this section, we formulate the relay selection process
as an optimal stopping problem and present our proposed
scheme in detail.
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Table 1 Notations
Notations

Definition

R

Number of candidate relays

T

The delay tolerance for the PU

β

The value of a packet

α

The time needed for checking each relay

M

The maximal number of relays that can be checked within T

Xi

The ith candidate relay

bi

The bid of Xi

vi

The private true valuation of Xi

Yn

Real-valued reward function for checking Xn

Vn(M)


(M)
E Vn+1

Maximum reward at stage n

ZM−n

Maximum expected reward at stage n + 1


(M)
A equal representation of E VM−n+1

4.1 Problem formulation

In the following, we first give a brief introduction of the
finite stopping problems and then formulate the relay
selection process accordingly.
Definition 1. Finite stopping problems: Given a
sequence of random variables, X1 , X2 , . . . , XM , and a
sequence of real-valued reward functions, y0 (), y1 (X1 ),
y2 (x1 , X2 ), . . . , yM (x1 , x2 , . . . , XM ), the objective is to find
a n, so that the reward function yn (x1 , x2 , . . . , Xn ) is the
maximal. Note that the joint distribution of the random
variables and the reward functions are known and that X
denotes the random variable and x denotes the value of a
random variable, respectively.
In order to maximize the PU’s utility, the PU makes
each decision by comparing the instantaneous reward of
selecting Xi with the expected reward of checking Xi+1 .
Accordingly, we formulate the relay selection process as a
sequence of decision problem which is defined based on
the theory of optimal stopping [14] below.
According to [15], the PU knows (or can learn) the
distribution of the bidding price of the bidders (candidate relays). We assume that there is no collusion among
the candidate relays, and the bidding price of the candidate relays is independently distributed. In this paper,
we particularly assume the bidding price follows the normal distribution with the mean value μ and the standard
(bi − μ)2
−
1
2σ 2 , where f (bi )
e
deviation σ , i.e., f (bi ) = √
2πσ
is the probability density function of bi . Note that, our
proposed scheme can be generally applied to any bidding
price distribution.
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We divide the bidding price range into J intervals so
that the price is within a finite-state space. We use S to
represent the finite-state space of the bidding price.


S = s1 = 0, s2 , s3 , . . . , sJ = β, sJ+1 = +∞ .
If the bidding price bi ∈[ sj , sj+1 ), we say that bi is in state
sj . The probability that bi is in state sj (j = 1, 2, . . . , J) is:

pj =
sj

sj+1


f (bi ) dbi =

sj+1
sj

√

1
2πσ

(bi − μ)2
2σ 2 dbi .
e
−

(1)
We use Xn to denote the bidding price of the nth
checked candidate relay. As a result, the probability that
Xn bid for sj is:
P(Xn = sj ) = pj , 1 ≤ j ≤ J, 1 ≤ n ≤ M.

(2)

Note that, in order to ensure that the PU’s cost is no
larger than β, we set sJ = β and sJ+1 = ∞.
Considering the fact that the time consumed for checking candidate relays are also valuable to the PU (because
the PU can use them to transmit other packets, and the PU
has a time limit to transmit a packet), checking more candidate relays should result in less PU’s utility. Therefore,
n·α
we use a decreasing function f (n) = C T to represent the
time’s impact, where C ∈ (0, 1]. Accordingly the PU’s realvalued reward function for checking the nth candidate
relay is:
Yn = yn (X1 , X2 , . . . , Xn ) = (β − Xn ) · f (n)
= (β − Xn ) · C

n·α
T

(3)

for 1 ≤ n ≤ M, C ∈ (0, 1].
According to [14], a necessary condition for the existence of optimal stopping rules to solve the problem is that
Yn should satisfy the following two requirements:
E{supn Yn } < +∞.

(4)

limsupn→+∞ Yn ≤ Y+∞ .

(5)

We have proven that the Yn defined in (3) satisfies the
requirements. Due to the page limit, we will report the
proof in our technical report.
4.2 Online auction-based selection scheme

We use Vn(M) (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) to represent the maximum
reward that could be obtained after checking n candidate
relays:

Vn(M) (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) = max yn (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ),

(M)
E Vn+1
(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn , Xn+1 )

| X1 = x1 , X2 = x2 , . . . , Xn = xn .
(6)
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In the above equation, yn (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) means
the instantaneous
reward if we stop at stage

(M)
n, E Vn+1 (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn , Xn+1 ) | X1 = x1 , X2 = x2 , . . . ,

Xn = xn represents the expected maximum reward by
proceeding to stage n + 1. Thus, it is better for the PU to
stop checking the next candidate relay when the instantaneous reward is larger than the expected maximum
reward. Accordingly, the stopping rule is:

(M)
If:yn (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) ≥ E Vn+1 (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn , Xn+1 )

| X1 = x1 , X2 = x2 , . . . , Xn = xn ,
(7)
the PU stops at stage n (selects the nth candidate relay);
otherwise, it continues to check the next candidate relay.
We use the method of backward induction to solve the
finite stopping problem under the above stopping rule.
Since the PU has to stop at stage M, we first calculate
the optimal stopping rule at stage M − 1, then conclude the optimal rule at stage M − 2, and so on until
we get the optimal rule at stage 1. We use ZM−n to represent the maximum
 expected reward at stage n + 1, i.e.,

(M)
ZM−n = E Vn+1 . We define that Z0 = −∞. As the
bidding price of each candidate relay is independent and
identically distributed, the value of the Zu , u = M−n, only
depends on the remaining number of steps u. Therefore,
the valuation of Zu can be calculated as follows:


M·α
(M)
= E{(β − XM ) · C T }
Z 1 = E VM
=C

M·α
T

=C

M·α
T

· (β − E(XM ))
·β −C

M·α
T

(8)

J

·

sj · pj .
j=1

When u ≥ 1, we can get:
Zu+1 = Emax{YM−u , Zu }
=

C
m

(M−u)·α
T

· (β − sm ) · pm +

Zu · pn ,

(9)

n

selfish candidate relays who bid untruthful, the payment
that is paid to the winner should be bid-independent.
As Zu is a static value for each u ∈[ 1, M], we can
have the highest bidding price for the checked candidate relay to win at each step. Specifically, at step n, if
yn (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) ≥ ZM−n , the winner gets payment pn ,
which is calculated as follows:
As : yn (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) = (β − pn ) · C
So:pn = β −

n·α
T

= ZM−n , (11)

ZM−n

(12)
n·α .
CT
Figure 2 briefly demonstrates the model of relay selection. Our proposed scheme is described in Algorithm 1.
When the PU needs to send a packet in a given time, it
first calculate M. The PU calculates M based on (1) the
delay requirement of a packet, (2) the time of checking
each candidate relay, and (3) the expected transmission
delay between the PU and the relays. After checking the
nth candidate relay, the PU computes yn and the expected
reward ZM−n . According to the comparison of yn and
ZM−n , the PU makes a decision whether to select Xn for
cooperative communication immediately. If the PU does
not chose any of the first M − 1 candidate relay, it has to
select the last candidate relay. Under this worst case, the
PU needs to pay the Mth candidate relay’s bidding price
bM . Note that, the decreasing function f (n) can prevent
the happening of the worst case, which has been verified
by the simulations.
Algorithm 1 Online auction for relay selection
1: Start checking from X1 ;
2: for n = 1 to M − 1 do
3:
Compute the reward function yn and the maximum
expected reward ZM−n according to Equations 3
and 9, respectively.
4:
if yn ≥ ZM−n then
5:
Choose relay Xn for cooperative communication;
6:
7:
8:

where the values of m and n need to satisfy the following
condition:


(M−u)·α
m ∈ j | C T · (β − sj ) ≥ Zu , j = 1, 2, . . . , J ,


(M−u)·α
n ∈ j | C T · (β − sj ) < Zu , j = 1, 2, . . . , J ,
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9:
10:
11:
12:

Calculate payment pn according to Equation 12;
Break;
else
Continue to check the next candidate relay Xn+1 .
end if
end for
Start cooperative transmissions and reward each
selected relay with its corresponding pn .

m + n = J.
(10)
Once a relay has been selected, the PU needs to calculate
its payment to the selected relay. In order to frustrate the

5 Rationality and truthfulness analysis
In this section, we justify that our proposed online
auction-based relay selection scheme is both truthful and
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Figure 2 The model of online relay selection.

individual rational. Due to the page limit, we only present
the main results. The detailed proof of the lemmas will be
given in our technical report.
Lemma 1. Zu ≥ 0, for u ∈[ 1, M].
Theorem 1. The proposed online auction scheme is individual rational.

Lemma 3. If bidder n wins the auction when bidding
truthfully, the payment from the PU is no less than its
evaluation, i.e., pn ≥ vn .
Lemma 4. If bidder n cannot win the auction when bidding truthfully, the possible payment from the PU is less
than its evaluation, i.e., pn ≤ vn .
Theorem 2. The auction scheme is truthful.

Proof. For winner n, 1 ≤ n ≤ M − 1, the payment it can
get is:
ZM−n

pn = β −
As:(β − bn ) · C
So:bn ≤ β −

C

n·α
T

n·α
T

≥ ZM−n

ZM−n
C

n·α
T

= pn

We can get that utility = pn − bn ≥ 0. If the winner is
M, its utility = 0. Therefore, we can conclude that, for any
winner, its utility ≥ 0.
For the PU, the value of the packet is β, and it has to pay
pn to winner n. When 1 ≤ n ≤ M − 1:

Proof. We use un and un to represent the utilities when
bidder n bids with vn and bn , respectively.
I. We consider the case that bn > vn .
1. Bidder n wins when bidding with either bn or vn :
according to Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we have
un = pn − vn = un ≥ 0;
2. Bidder n loses with bn but wins with vn : according to
Lemma 3, we can get un = 0 ≤ pn − vn = un ;
3. Bidder n wins with bn but loses with vn : this cannot
happen in our auction scheme;
4. Bidder n loses with both bn and vn : un = un = 0;
II. We consider the case that bn < vn .

According to Lemma 1, we have Zu ≥ 0, u ∈[ 1, M].
Thus, utility ≥ 0. When n = M, the utility = β − bM . As
the PU has to transmit the packet in this worst case, it is
also rational.

1. Bidder n wins when bidding with either bn or vn :
according to Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we have
un = pn − vn = un ≥ 0;
2. Bidder n loses with bn but wins with vn : this cannot
happen in our auction scheme;
3. Bidder n wins with bn but loses with vn : according to
Lemma 4, we can get un = pn − vn ≤ 0 = un ;
4. Bidder n loses with both bn and vn : un = un = 0.

Lemma 2. The payment to winner n will be the same
whatever it had bidden for bn or vn .

Through the analysis of all the possible cases, we can conclude that the utility of the bidder n cannot be increased

utility = β − pn
=

ZM−n
C

n·α
T

Jing et al. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking (2015) 2015:20

if bn  = vn . Therefore, our auction scheme can ensure the
bidding truthfulness.

6 Simulations
In this section, we conduct simulations to examine the
performance of our proposed online auction mechanism.
We assume that the bidding price of each candidate relay
follows the normal distribution with the expected value
μ = 0.5 and the variance σ = 0.2. We partition the bidding price into J = 20 intervals. We set the time limit
for the PU to select a relay is 90 time slots, i.e. ,T = 90.
In the following, we study the impact of the parameters
such as α, C, and β on the number of observation steps
and the reward of the PU, respectively. In order to justify the effectiveness of our scheme, we compare ours with
the ORS scheme, which has the knowledge of who is the
optimal relay that has the maximal PU reward among the
M candidate relays. In the ORS scheme, the PU checks
the candidate relay one by one randomly and stops after
checking the optimal relay. The simulations are conducted
under several network scales. Particularly, the M takes the
value of 20, 30, and 40, separately. Each reported result is
the average of 100 independent instances.
6.1 The impact of observation duration α

In this subsection, we set the time efficiency parameter C = 0.3. The private value of the packet β = 0.9.
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the number of observation steps and the observation duration α
under different network scales. From Figure 3, we observe
that the PU generally stops checking within six steps in
our scheme. When α changes from 2 to 2.2, there is an

Figure 3 Average number of observation steps α.
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obvious decline on the number of observation steps in our
scheme. Generally speaking, a larger α results in a smaller
observation steps. This is because the cost of checking a
candidate relay is large when α is big. Thus, the PU intends
to find a proper relay as soon as possible. On the other
hand, when α is small, the PU may attempt to check more
candidate relays to maximize its reward. We also find that
the number of observation steps is always less than M,
which indicates that the worst case of choosing the Mth
relay will not happen. In addition, we can see that the
number of observation steps of ORS is always higher than
the corresponding one of ours. It means that our scheme
needs less time for selecting a cooperative relay.
In Figure 4, we compare our scheme with ORS in terms
of reward. Specifically, the reward of our scheme is normalized by the corresponding one of ORS, and we name
this ratio as relative monetary reward. Figure 4 shows the
relationship between the relative monetary reward of the
PU and the observation duration. According to the results,
we find that the relative reward of the PU fluctuates
with the checking duration α, but with a small variance
(within 4%), and that the relative monetary reward is
always higher than 91.5%. Jointly considering the results in
Figure 3, we can conclude that our scheme selects the relay
sooner, and the monetary reward for a single transmission
is slightly smaller than the one of ORS.
By the time that the PU finds the optimal relay in OSR,
the PU in our scheme can find multiple relays and get
rewards via transmitting multiple packets. Therefore, to
make a fair comparison in terms of reward, we define
the ratio of monetary reward as the ratio between the
total reward obtained in our scheme and the reward of
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Figure 4 Relative reward for one packet transmission α.

ORS during the same time period. The value of ratio is
reported in the Figure 5. From Figure 5, we find that the
ratio monetary reward is always higher than 1. The maximum value can reach 2 when α = 1 and M = 40. In other
words, our proposed scheme can produce higher reward
than OSR during the same time period.
6.2 The impact of time efficiency C

In this subsection, we set the observation duration α = 2,
the private value of the packet β = 0.9. From Figure 6,
we can see that the PU can stop within six steps in our
scheme, and the number of observation steps increases
with the increase of C. This is because the impact of C on

Figure 5 Ratio of reward during the same time period with α.

the reward is big when C is small. Thus, the PU intends
to stop as soon as possible at a smaller C. By comparing
with the ORS scheme, we can find that the number of
observation steps in our scheme is always less than the
corresponding one of ORS.
In Figure 7, we compare our scheme with ORS scheme
in terms of relative reward for one packet transmission
under different C. Similarly, the results of our scheme
are normalized by the corresponding one of ORS. From
Figure 7, we find that the relative reward decreases with
the increase of C. The reason is that the time impact on
the reward function is small when C approximate 1. In
general, the relative reward is larger than 85%.
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Figure 6 Average number of observation steps with C.

Similarly to the ratio results reported in Figure 5, we
report the ratio of reward in Figure 8 under several C.
From Figure 8, we can see that the ratio of monetary
reward increases with the increase of C. The value of the
ratio is always larger than 1 and can reach 3 when M = 40
and C = 0.9. In other words, the reward of our scheme
is always higher than the one of ORS scheme during the
same time period.
6.3 The impact of private value β

In this subjection, we set the observation duration α =
2 and time efficiency C = 0.3. Figure 9 reports the
relationship between the observation steps and β. From

Figure 7 Relative reward for one packet transmission with C.

Figure 9, we can observe that the number of observation
steps decreases with β at the beginning in our scheme.
When β is between 0.6 and 0.7, the number of observation steps reaches the smallest value. Hereafter, the curve
rises with the increase of β. When β = 1, the number
of observation steps reaches the largest value 5. The reason for the trend of curve is that it is hard to find a relay
that makes a small bid when the value of β is small, and
the PU intends to check more candidate relays to find
larger reward when β is big. We also observe that with
different number of candidate relays, the number of observation steps almost stay the same. By comparing with
ORS, we can see that the number of observation steps in
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Figure 8 Ratio of reward during the same time period with C.

our scheme is always less than the corresponding one of
ORS.
In Figure 10, we plot the relative reward for one packet
transmission under several β. From Figure 10, we can
see that the relative reward increases with the increase of
β. The reason is that a larger β can enlarge the reward.
When β is greater than 0.8, the relative reward is larger
than 90%.
Figure 11 reports the ratio of reward time during the
same time period under several β. From Figure 11, we can

Figure 9 Average number of observation steps with β.

observe that the ratio fluctuates with β, but the value of
the ratio is always higher than 1.
In summary, we can conclude that the PU can always
select a relay within six observations by our scheme, which
is much less than the number of observation steps in OSR.
Although the reward of transmitting one packet in our
scheme may be slightly smaller than the corresponding
one in OSR, the accumulated reward of our scheme is
always much larger than the corresponding one of OSR for
transmitting multiple packets in a given time period.
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Figure 10 Relative reward for one packet transmission with β.

7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have designed an online auctionbased relay selection scheme for cooperative communication in CR networks. Without checking the information from all the candidate relays, the PU can select a
desirable relay within a given time limit. Our scheme
achieves the property of truthfulness, which assures
that all the bidders reveal their true valuations and

Figure 11 Ratio of reward during the same time period with β.

eliminates the fear of market manipulation. Meanwhile,
our scheme is individual rational, which guarantees that
both the PU and relays can be benefited from cooperative communication. Extensive simulations show that
our scheme enables the PU to select a proper relay in
a very short time and achieves a higher accumulated
reward in a given time period comparing to the OSR
scheme.
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